We investigate the relationship between controversial roll call votes and support for Democratic incumbents in the 2010 midterm elections. Consistent with previous analyses, we find that supporters of health care reform paid a significant price at the polls. We go beyond these analyses by identifying a mechanism for this apparent effect: constituents perceived incumbents who supported health care reform as more ideologically distant (in this case, more liberal), which in turn was associated with lower support for the incumbent. Our analyses show that this perceived ideological difference mediates most of the apparent impact of support for health care reform on both individual-level vote choice and aggregate-level vote share. We conclude by simulating counterfactuals that suggest health care reform may have cost Democrats their House majority.
2011). These findings are most robust for health care reform. Using statistical matching techniques, we isolate a more comparable set of members and districts and demonstrate that Democratic incumbents' support for health care reform was associated with lower vote share.
Second, and more importantly, how is it that roll call votes come to affect election outcomes? Previous work has demonstrated an association between support for certain pieces of legislation and vote share, but has not identified a causal mechanism. We propose such a mechanism: support for controversial legislation causes voters to see their representatives as more ideologically distant. We find support for this hypothesis among individual voters. We then show that this perception of ideological distance actually mediates much of the apparent impact of support for health care reform on both individual-level vote choice and aggregate-level election outcomes.
Third, could support for health care reform have cost the Democratic Party not only votes but seats? We simulate the Democratic seat share in the House of Representatives in a counterfactual scenario in which all Democrats in competitive districts opposed health care reform. In this scenario, Democrats would have retained an average of an additional 25 seats and would have had a 62% chance of winning enough races to maintain majority control of the House.
Our account benefits from new methods and survey data that have only become available to political scientists in the last few years. It thereby provides a methodological template and accompanying inferential standard for future efforts of this kind. Our account also constitutes one of the first efforts to trace the entire process of electoral accountability: from specific incumbent behavior to voter attitudes to election results. In the 2010 election, health care reform appeared to cost Democrats a large number of votes, primarily by making them appear more liberal, and may have cost them control of the House.
Roll Call Voting and Electoral Accountability
Given voters' lack of attention to day-to-day events in Congress, it may seem unlikely that they could hold legislators accountable for their voting records. In fact, early research on congressional elections emphasized the visibility of challengers more than the substance of incumbent behavior (Mann and Wolfinger 1981) . However, members of Congress seem to think that their votes matter. Although most of them are reelected even in "anti-incumbent" years like 2010, they act as if reelection depends on avoiding mistakes, consulting extensively before casting votes on controversial issues (Kingdon 1973) .
Members do have some reason to worry because their voting records appear to affect their electoral safety. For instance, members with more ideologically extreme records (Erikson 1971; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Carson 2008; McGhee and Pearson forthcoming) and higher party unity scores (Carson 2008 , Carson et al. 2010 attract less support at the polls than do more moderate members, although the penalty for ideological extremism is most severe in competitive districts (Montgomery and Nyhan 2010, Griffin and Newman n.d.) .
But can specific roll call votes matter over and above a member's overall record? There is certainly anecdotal evidence that voters punish members who cast controversial votes on salient issues. For instance, Rep. Jeannette Rankin (R-MT), the first woman to serve in the House of Representatives, lost her seat after just one term because of her vote against U.S. entry into World War I (Lopach and Luckowski 2005, Smith 2002 ). The same fate befell her in 1942 after she was elected to Congress again and voted against entry into World War II. Similarly, Rep. Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA) was defeated after casting the deciding vote for President Clinton's 1993 budget (Heidom 1994 ).
More systematic analyses have also highlighted the electoral perils of specific votes. Jacobson (1995) finds that support for key initiatives of President Bill Clinton-the 1993 budget and NAFTA-hurt Democratic incumbents in the 1994 election. Canes-Wrone, Minozzi, and Reveley (2011) find that Democrats who cast votes that were "tough on crime" did significantly better in the 1994, 1996, and 1998 elections-the period in recent history during which public concern with crime was at its peak. More recently, Green and Hudak (2009) were less likely to approve of their job performance and to vote for them.
The midterm election of 2010 provides an ideal test for whether individual roll call votes can affect incumbent electoral performance. During the 111 th Congress, House Democrats passed high-profile legislation to reform health care, stimulate the economy, and create a cap and trade system designed to reduce greenhouse gases. These bills helped provoke a popular backlash that was more severe than most Democrats expected. The economic stimulus bill served as a major rallying point for the nascent Tea Party movement, and health care reform only added to the controversy (Saldin 2010) . Cap and trade received less attention-in part because it did not pass the Senate-but the bill was seen as an important issue in districts that would be most affected by the price it would have placed on carbon emissions (Samuelsohn and Bravender 2010) .
Republicans were quick to use these controversial votes in advertisements attacking Democratic incumbents. For instance, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) ran radio ads attacking pro-stimulus votes by 30 vulnerable House Democrats in February 2009 (Ambinder 2009 ) and later ran ads accusing stimulus supporters of providing funds to create jobs in China (Karl 2010) . Similarly, the NRCC ran ads attacking 31 Democratic incumbents who supported health care reform (Sack 2010 ) and 14 Democrats who backed capand-trade (Power 2009 ). The health care assault was especially fierce. By late October 2010, the Campaign Media Analysis Group estimated that reform opponents (including outside groups)
had spent $108 million on advertisements against the legislation, roughly six times the amount spent by supporters (Sack 2010) . Initial estimates from the Wesleyan Media Project show that
Republicans mentioned health care in television ads three times as much as Democrats and that 70% of those were attack ads (Fowler and Ridout 2010) .
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The outcome was record losses for Democrats. Sixty-three Democratic incumbents went down to defeat in 2010, the largest gain for Republicans in the House since 1938. Undoubtedly, many of these losses could be attributed to the weak economy, the size of the Democratic majority, and the number of marginal seats held by Democrats. However, the number of seats lost exceeded even pre-election forecasts that included these predictors (Sides 2010, Brady, Fiorina, and Wilkins 2011) , suggesting that the controversial roll calls might account for the difference.
Masket and Greene (2010) first picked up on this possibility in a pre-election blog post examining the prospects for Democratic House members from conservative districts. constitute the point of departure for our analysis, which focuses on the individual-level mechanism by which incumbents were punished and the aggregate-level relationships between roll call votes and electoral outcomes (including seat share).
A Theory of Roll Call Effects
The most plausible case for the electoral effects of roll call votes should connect voter perceptions with aggregate consequences. We adopt this approach and focus on negative effects of roll call votes on electoral performance (which seem more likely than positive effects in a real-world context). For a roll call vote to have a harmful effect on incumbent performance, five criteria must be met.
First, the incumbent must cast a salient vote that contradicts the preferences of the median voter in his or her district. Despite the model of reelection-minded representatives that has become so widely accepted in political science (Mayhew 1974 , Mann 1978 , Jacobson 1987 ), newer models of parties (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2001, Cox and McCubbins 2007) suggest that votes that defy the median voter should occur frequently in the contemporary era. Not only are incumbents likely to have relatively extreme views (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010), but party activists and officials often demand support for proposals that might offend the median voter (Masket 2009 ). Given the potential costs of dissent, which could include a primary challenge (Bawn et al. 2006) , many representatives will cast such votes despite possible risks to their general election campaign.
The second condition for a roll call effect is the dissemination of information about the vote itself. Put simply, voters cannot react to a roll call vote of which they are not aware.
Creating such awareness can be difficult. Representation entails an inevitable principal-agent problem in which the intentions and actions of representatives are often hidden from their relatively inattentive constituents-a problem made worse by meager local media coverage (Arnold 2005) . Nonetheless, voters may learn about roll call votes through the back-and-forth of a competitive campaign (Arnold 1992, Mann and Wolfinger 1981) , particularly if an out-of-step vote attracts a quality challenger (Jacobson 1989 ). We do not test for this step in the process directly, but the presence of any electoral effect from roll calls presupposes its existence.
The third criterion is that the information that reaches voters about the roll call vote must cause them to update their beliefs about the incumbent. Drawing on spatial voting theory, we focus in particular on voters' perception of the member's ideology. We hypothesize that salient and controversial votes for party agenda items will cause many voters to perceive legislators as more extreme and ideologically distant than they otherwise would have, based on the overall voting record of the incumbent. 
Roll Call Votes and Constituent Perceptions
How exactly do roll call votes affect the way constituents perceive their members? We investigate whether members' roll call voting behavior leads respondents to perceive them as more ideologically extreme and then whether perceptions of ideological difference are associated with support for the incumbent.
Our investigation relies on the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).
The CCES was administered online by YouGov of Palo Alto, CA, which recruits people to a panel and then solicits panel members to take surveys. In this case, it matched those who agreed to take the CCES to a random sample of the U.S. population on such attributes as race, religion, income, education, sex, party identification, and ideological orientation. As in other types of surveys, the CCES also includes sampling weights that adjust the sample's demographics to mirror Census data. Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2011) find that this methodology produces samples similar to those produced by other survey modes on most dimensions. The main exception is that respondents tend to be more interested in and knowledgeable about politics (see also Hill et al. 2007 • The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the stimulus), which passed 244-188 on January 28, 2009, with support from 216 of the 230 Democrats in our sample.
Roll call votes and perceptions of member ideology
Our first analysis examines respondents' perceptions of their Democratic representative and how those perceptions vary with the incumbent's support for the stimulus, health care reform, and cap and trade. The CCES asked respondents to place the incumbent on a seven-point scale from "very liberal" (1) to "very conservative" (7). Figure 1 displays the distribution of responses for those who could place the Democratic incumbent on this scale. 4 In each of the three subfigures, we present a kernel density plots of the distributions of perceived ideology for incumbents who supported and opposed each roll call vote. This provides an initial test of whether roll call voting is associated with perceptions of members' ideology.
[insert Figure Democratic incumbents as more liberal than Democrats do. We also control for members' ideology via their first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores because perceptions of member ideology should be associated with members' overall voting records.
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[insert Table 1 about here] Table 1 presents the results of these models. 6 Party identification and member ideology have their expected association with perceived ideology: as party identification shifts toward the Republican end of the spectrum, the expected placement of the Democratic incumbent shifts toward the liberal end. On average, a strong Republican would place these incumbents 1.5 units to the left of where a strong Democrat would place them. Members who have more moderate voting records (as measured by their first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores) are also perceived to be less liberal: the most liberal and conservative representatives in this sample of Democratic incumbents would be perceived to be 0.66 units apart, other things equal.
The apparent effects of these roll calls are also evident. We find that Democratic incumbents who supported health care reform and cap and trade, although not the stimulus, are perceived to be more liberal. Of these votes, health care reform is most strongly associated with perceived ideology. All else equal, a supporter of health care reform would be placed 0.73 units further to the left of the respondent than an opponent-a larger shift than the estimated DW-NOMINATE effect noted above.
Our model of perceived ideological differences in the second column of results in Table 1 supports this finding. In contrast to the ideological placement model, we find that members who supported the stimulus were seen as more liberal than their constituents, but cap and trade had no significant association with ideological difference. The apparent effect of health care reform is still present: relative to opponents of health care, supporters were seen as more liberal than their constituents. Auxiliary analyses (available on request) show that the effects of health care reform were concentrated among Republicans and independents, who were naturally less likely to support the bill. The relationship between supporting health care reform and perceived ideological difference was greater for pure independents (b=-0.78; s.e.=0.27) and Republicans (b=-0.89; s.e.=0.13) than for Democrats (b=-0.38; s.e.=0.13).
In short, roll call votes in support of these controversial bills appeared to lead constituents to see Democratic incumbents as more liberal. The strongest and most consistent relationships involved health care reform, especially among independents and Republicans. Before conducting this analysis, we modify the perceived ideological difference variable from the version analyzed in Figure 2 and Table 1 . First, we collapse the small number of respondents who placed themselves to the left of the Democratic incumbent. No matter how far to the left they were, the vast majority of these respondents voted for the Democrat. Second, we reversed the coding of this variable so that higher values indicate that respondents placed themselves further to the ideological right of the incumbent. The resulting measure ranges from 0 to 6 where 0 indicates that the respondent is to the left of or ideologically the same as the incumbent and 6 indicates that the respondent believes that he or she is very conservative and the incumbent is very liberal.
Estimates of the mediating effect of perceived member ideology
Finally, we estimate models both for the entire sample and for Democrats, independents, and Republicans separately. (Independents who lean toward a party are counted as partisans.)
Partisans were quite polarized in their support for health care reform and these other initiatives and thus their responses may differ. In the models for independents, we drop party identification.
In the models for Democrats and Republicans, we substitute a measure of strength of partisanship, which is coded 1 for independents who lean towards the party, 2 for weak partisans, and 3 for strong partisans.
[insert (2011) suggest, the effect of supporting the bills appears to vary depending on district partisanship. However, most opponents represent competitive districts, while supporters are concentrated in safer districts that backed Obama by wide margins. Since we lack cases in which opponents of health care reform and the other two votes represent more conservative districts, the statistical models presented above may be extrapolating beyond the bounds of the observed data (see, e.g., Ho et al. 2007 ).
To address these concerns, Columns 2-4 of The vote share of supporters of cap and trade was 3.1 points lower than that of opponents, which is consistent with the findings of Brady, Fiorina, and Wilkins (2011) . The apparent effect of the stimulus is again null.
Having established that the negative relationship between support for health care reform and vote choice hold at the aggregate level, we now test our hypothesized mediation model. As in the individual-level data, Democratic incumbents who supported health care reform were seen as more liberal on average by their constituents than those who did not. 9 The question is whether this roll call vote had an indirect effect on vote share via increased perceptions of ideological distance. To test whether individual opinions affected election outcomes, we first need estimates of constituent opinion in each congressional district-specifically, average perceptions of ideological distance from the incumbent. We generate these aggregated opinion estimates with data from the CCES, using multilevel regression and poststratification to improve the precision of these estimates. We then estimated how much these district-level perceptions of ideological distance mediated the relationship between these roll call votes and vote share. (Details of this analysis can be found in Appendix B.) As in the individual-level analysis, we also find that the relationship between these roll call votes-and health care reform in particular-was substantially mediated by perceived ideological distance. Among all Democratic incumbents, both the mediation effect via perceived ideological distance and the direct effect of health care reform are negative and statistically significant. However, among the matched sample of health care reform supporters and opponents, the direct effect is no longer significant but the mediated effect is significant, reducing supporters' vote share by approximately 4.5 percentage points via an increase in perceived ideological distance. By contrast, the apparent effects of cap and trade in Table 3 are not evident in the matched sample. Thus, both the individual-level and aggregate-level analyses confirm that support for health care reform was associated with electoral losses for Democratic incumbents largely because of the effects of this roll call vote on perceived ideological distance.
Health Care Reform and Democratic Seat Share
The results above suggest that health care reform had a powerful effect on the vote share To estimate this effect, we simulate the predicted vote share for these incumbents using the health care reform model for the full sample in Table 3 , comparing predicted outcomes in the observed data with a counterfactual in which all Democrats in competitive districts voted against reform. 10 We then compare the number of seats predicted to be held by Democrats in the two scenarios. Over 10,000 simulations, the median outcome hands Democrats 25 additional seats they otherwise lost (95% CI: 21, 29). In 62 percent of simulations, Democrats are predicted to win 25 or more additional seats, which would have given them enough to retain the House (they ended up with 193 seats after the election). This estimate suggests that health care reform may account for the difference between Democrats' 63-seat loss and the median academic forecast of 44 seats in Table 1 of Brady, Fiorina, and Wilkins (2011) .
Conclusion
To use President Obama's term, Democrats got a "shellacking" in the 2010 election. This outcome caught many observers by surprise. It was never going to be a good year for the majority party given the number of marginal seats they had to defend, the weak economy, and the president's middling approval ratings, but few observers thought they would lose 63 House The plot presents a kernel density of the difference between the perceived ideology of Democratic incumbents and constituents' own ideologies. The vertical lines denote the average difference for Republican, Democratic, and independent constituents, counting independents who lean towards a party as partisans. The bandwidth is 0.50. Source: 2010 CCES. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
The data are weighted with sampling weights and the standard errors are calculated to reflect clustering within congressional districts. Ideological placement is coded 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Perceived ideological difference is coded -6 (more conservative than incumbent) to +6 (more liberal than incumbent). *p<0.05. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 2-4 include matched samples of bill supporters in competitive districts and their most comparable opponents and include weights to maximize balance. *p<0.05.
Appendix A: Additional individual-level analysis and robustness tests
To investigate the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 , we conducted a variety of additional analyses of the individual-level CCES data.
Different dependent variable
Similar findings emerge in models of approval of incumbent job performance.
Specifically, independent and Republican voters are less likely to approve of a supporter of health care reform than an opponent. In addition, the apparent effect of support for health care reform is again reduced when we control for perceived ideological difference, which itself is substantively and statistically significant. These results are available on request.
Endogeneity of perceived ideological differences
Our findings are also supported by instrumental variables models that seek to account for the potential endogeneity of perceived ideological difference to vote choice-namely, people may exaggerate the perceived difference for candidates they do not like, which may inflate the probit coefficients we report. Following Ansolabehere and Jones (2010), we use the roll call votes as instruments for perceived ideological difference in IV probit models and find that the coefficients are uniformly larger, suggesting that endogeneity is not inflating our estimates.
These results are also available upon request.
Bias and causal inference issues in mediation estimates
The estimation approach we use in the main text to detect mediation-contrasting models that include and exclude the mediating variable-can produce biased estimates of mediation effects (Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010) . To address this concern, we also implement the approach to causal mediation analysis developed by Imai et al. (2009 Imai et al. ( , 2010a Imai et al. ( , 2010b , which allows for nonparametric estimation of mediation models and sensitivity testing of the key assumptions necessary for the results to be interpreted as causal. 12 Table A-1 reports estimated mediation, direct, and total effects along with 95% confidence intervals for each of the three roll call votes on individual vote choice for Democrats with a probit outcome model (Democrat=1, Republican=0) and a linear model for perceived ideological difference.
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The first two columns of results in Table A-1 present estimates and confidence intervals for all CCES respondents who were represented by a Democratic incumbent who faced a
Republican challenger (excluding those respondents with missing data for self-reported ideology, perceptions of representative ideology, or party identification). Democratic incumbents' support for health care reform is associated with a lower likelihood that their constituents would vote to re-elect them, and this effect was largely mediated by perceived ideological difference. The mediation effect (-0.07) accounts for 93% of the total effect (-0.08). Support for cap and trade also had a negative and significant mediating effect, but the total effect of both the stimulus and cap and trade was null.
Table A-2 disaggregates the estimated effect of health care reform to determine how it varies across partisan subgroups. As in Table 2 , the relationship between health care reform and vote choice is evident only for independents and Republicans. Again, most of the effect of this 12 To do so, we use the mediation package for R (Tingley et al. 2011) . 13 The 95% confidence intervals for all mediation results in this paper are calculated using 1000 nonparametric bootstrap repetitions. In this case, our treatment is at the district level but the mediating and outcome variables are at the individual level, a so-called "2-1-1" structure which can distort mediation results by confounding between-and within-group variance in the mediating and outcome variables (Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang 2010) . As recommended by Zhang, Zyphur, and Preacher (2009) , we account for this issue by creating a district-level mean value of perceived ideological difference as well as an individual-level deviation from that mean. Details are available from the authors upon request.
roll call vote is mediated by perceived ideological difference. For example, among Republicans, the mediation effect (-0.12) is 80% of the total effect (-0.15).
These results do not appear to be driven by differences in the types of Democrats who voted for or against the bills in question. The third and fourth columns in Tables A-1 and A-2 report equivalent results for a matched set of Democratic incumbents. Using Sekhon's (2011) genetic matching algorithm, we match the Democratic supporters of each bill in competitive districts, which we define as those in which President Obama received less than 60% of the twoparty vote in 2008, to the most comparable opponents of each bill. Thus, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) where the treatment is supporting the bill in question in a competitive district and the estimand of interest is the effect of that support on vote choice.
Given the small sample size, we match on only three variables: two-party district presidential vote in 2008, the incumbent's Congressional Quarterly party unity score, and the incumbent's first-dimension DW-NOMINATE ideal point. 14 Though we cannot achieve perfect balance, Table A -3 shows that the distributions are far more similar after matching (more details on the procedure used are available upon request).
Among respondents represented by this smaller but more comparable set of representatives, the same story emerges: a representative's support for health care reform is associated with a lower likelihood that their constituents voted for them, but this relationship is largely mediated by perceived ideological difference. The substantive magnitude of these apparent effects is again largest among Republican voters.
For these estimates to be causal, the mediator must be unrelated to the outcome variable given the treatment and pre-treatment covariates. To address this concern, we use the sensitivity 14 Before matching, we drop control units outside the support of the treatment units-i.e., those with a predicted probability of treatment that is less than the minimum predicted probability (or greater than the maximum predicted probability) of any observed treatment unit.
analysis approach developed by Keele, Imai, and Yamamoto (2010a) . Their sensitivity analysis provides an estimate of how large the correlation (ρ) between the errors of the mediation and outcome models would need to be in order to nullify our results. If our results are sensitive to only a small correlation in the errors-i.e., a very modest violation of the conditions necessary for causal inference-then we cannot be very confident in what we have found. But if the correlation would need to be substantially larger to nullify our results, then our results are less sensitive to violations of the assumptions needed to ensure causal inference.
For the sample as a whole-i.e., the results presented in the first two columns of Table A- 1-the correlation ρ would need to equal -0.45 to nullify the mediation effect of the health care reform vote. The correlation would need to be even greater (ρ=-0.55) to eliminate this mediation effect in the matched sample of respondents in competitive districts, thereby increasing our confidence in these results. The effects that we report among partisan subgroups (Table A-2) are also not particularly sensitive. For Republican respondents in our matched sample-where we report a mediation effect of -0.14 and a total effect of -0.13-the correlation ρ would have to equal -0.55 for the mediation effect to equal 0. Cell entries are estimates from the mediation package for R (Tingley et al. 2011) . Data are from the 2010 CCES and include respondent weights. Matched data include respondents in competitive districts whose representatives voted yes on the bill and those in districts represented by the bill's most comparable opponents. *p<0.05. Cell entries are estimates from the mediation package for R (Tingley et al. 2011) . Data are from the 2010 CCES and include respondent weights. Matched data include respondents in competitive districts whose representatives voted yes on the bill and those in districts represented by the bill's most comparable opponents. *p<0.05. 
Robustness to previous ideological perceptions in 2008
A key component of our argument is that roll call votes created a shift in ideological perceptions. The obvious rejoinder is that the causal arrow points the other way: incumbent legislators may have based their roll call votes on how their constituents already perceived them or even on how they believed those perceptions would change as a consequence of voting a particular way. We can address this possibility in several ways.
17 Obtaining individual-level census data for weighting purposes was one of the biggest challenges to applying MRP to congressional districts. Such individual-level data are only available for Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs).
To convert the PUMA data to congressional districts, we used block-level equivalency files from the Missouri Census Data Center (Blodgett 2010) for a proportional overlay conversion. Such a conversion assumes that the demographic characteristics being converted are uniformly distributed across the geographic unit in question, an assumption that is problematic for certain characteristics. To validate the conversion, we used the same conversion file on aggregate-level 2000 census data, which is available for both PUMAs and districts. To best approximate the fine-grained weighting categories used in MRP, we converted age by race by gender (for a total of 12 categories). Race is particularly likely to violate the uniform distribution assumption, so it offers a tough test case of the conversion process. When we regressed the converted numbers on the actual numbers for each of the 12 categories, it suggested a very good fit: the slope estimate was never smaller than 0.90, and the R 2 never fell below 0.96. Scatter plots also suggested no serious outliers or non-linear relationships. Thus, we feel confident in the quality of the demographic estimates. The details of this validation procedure are available from the authors upon request.
First, as Table 3 shows, supporters of these roll call votes were perceived as more liberal than opponents even among a set of representatives who are matched on their roll call voting record (as measured by their first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores), their level of party unity, and the partisanship of their districts. This approach is not foolproof since it may fail to account for other confounding factors (particularly those that are unobservable), but it does account for several important factors that affect perceived ideologies.
Second, we can draw on a measure of perceived ideologies that precedes the treatment.
The 2008 CCES also asked respondents to place their representative on an ideological scale that ranged from 0-100 (which we rescaled to 0-10). This scale differs from the seven-point scale included in the 2010 CCES, but that should not compromise the types of conclusions we draw here. As we did in 2010, we create district-level estimates-via multilevel regression and poststratification-of mean perceived ideology in 2008 for 225 of the 240 Democratic incumbents in our 2010 sample. This measure allows us to perform several auxiliary analyses.
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As a placebo test, we begin by comparing the perceived ideologies in 2008 for our matched set of health care supporters and opponents (see the description of the procedure used to generate this dataset in Appendix A). We find very little difference in how they were perceived in 2008. The mean perceived ideological locations of supporters and opponents of health care reform in the matched sample were nearly identical (3.2 and 3.3, respectively, on the 0-10 scale).
This result suggests that our matching procedure identified a treatment and control group who were perceived relatively similarly before the health care reform vote. 18 To be clear, the analysis of perceived ideological difference that we report in the main text is at the individual level ( Aggregate-level mediation model Table B -2 shows that our aggregate-level mediation results are consistent with the individual-level mediation results presented in Appendix A and that they hold among our matched set of comparable Democratic incumbents. In particular, we again find that most of the apparent effect of health care reform on vote share is mediated by perceived ideological difference: the mediation effect (-4.39 points) constitutes 75% of the total effect (-5.87). We again gauged the sensitivity of our results using the method of Keele, Imai, and Yamamoto (2010a) . The mediation effect appears to be relatively robust. In the matched sample, the correlation in the errors between the mediator and outcome equations would have to equal -0.4
for the effect of health care reform to be zero.
By contrast, the apparent effects of support for the stimulus and cap and trade are again weaker and less consistent. The estimated mediated, direct, and total effects of the stimulus on vote share are null. The total effect of cap and trade on vote share is negative and significant, but this result is not robust to matching, suggesting that the significant finding in the full sample may be an artifact of the differing set of districts represented by supporters and opponents. Cell entries are linear effect estimates from the mediation package for R (Tingley et al. 2011) .
Matched samples of bill supporters in competitive districts and their most comparable opponents include weights to maximize balance. Democrats who did not face a GOP challenger are excluded from all models. *p<0.05.
